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Abstract	  	  This	  article	  examines	  the	  emergence	  and	  transformation	  of	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  in	  the	  context	  of	  changing	  international	  relations.	  Focusing	  on	  foreign	  policy	  discourses	  and	  practices,	  the	  article	  portrays	  peace	  engagement	  as	  value-­‐based	  efforts	  to	  support	  resolution	  of	  distant	  intrastate	  conflicts,	  and	  a	  strategy	  to	  promote	  Norway’s	  interests	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  relations.	  The	  article	  also	  argues	  that	  changing	  international	  relations	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  has	  challenged	  and	  reoriented	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  in	  a	  more	  realist	  direction.	  Foreign	  policy	  discourses	  and	  practices	  are	  increasingly	  based	  on	  a	  broad	  notion	  of	  interests	  that	  also	  includes	  ideals	  of	  peace,	  democracy	  and	  development.	  This	  means	  that	  peace	  engagement	  can	  support	  a	  domestic	  political	  consensus	  on	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  simultaneously	  promote	  Norway’s	  standing,	  relevance	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  relations.	  Peace	  engagement	  has	  thus	  been	  institutionalized	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  that	  promotes	  peace	  while	  also	  addressing	  the	  challenges	  associated	  with	  smallness	  in	  international	  relations.	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Introduction	  	  Studies	  of	  international	  relations	  have	  tended	  to	  privilege	  major	  actors	  in	  world	  politics,	  their	  economic	  and	  security	  interests,	  and	  hard	  power	  capabilities	  and	  strategies.	  Small	  states	  have	  been	  given	  less	  overall	  attention	  and	  their	  international	  strategies	  are	  often	  portrayed	  as	  ‘playing	  it	  small’	  by	  aligning	  themselves	  to	  major	  powers	  in	  security	  alliances	  to	  overcome	  their	  lack	  of	  hard	  power	  capabilities.	  This	  article	  examines	  a	  case	  that	  seems	  to	  challenge	  this	  representation.	  Norway	  has	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  sought	  to	  achieve	  a	  position	  of	  international	  influence	  by	  becoming	  a	  major	  actor	  within	  “engagement	  politics”.	  This	  includes	  a	  strong	  legacy	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  and	  development	  aid,	  but	  also	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  peace	  engagement	  and	  climate	  change	  diplomacy	  (Lunde,	  Thune,	  Fleischer,	  Grünfeld	  and	  Sending	  2008;	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  2009a,	  2009b;	  Thune	  and	  Lunde	  2013).	  Peace	  engagement	  has	  become	  an	  important	  and	  visible	  element	  of	  such	  engagement	  politics.	  Norway	  has	  gained	  publicity	  as	  a	  facilitator	  for	  peace	  negotiations	  and	  donor	  for	  peacebuilding	  in	  several	  intrastate	  conflicts	  (Figure	  1).	  The	  facilitator	  role	  was	  initiated	  with	  the	  Israel-­‐Palestine	  peace	  process	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  has	  been	  furthered	  in	  other	  conflict	  situations	  since	  then,	  especially	  in	  Colombia,	  Guatemala,	  the	  Philippines,	  and	  Sri	  Lanka,	  but	  also	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Hercegovina,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Libya.	  Norway	  has	  also	  participated	  in	  joint	  peacebuilding	  efforts	  in	  South	  Sudan,	  Somalia,	  Timor	  Leste,	  Haiti,	  Nepal	  and	  other	  countries.	  The	  most	  recent	  additions	  to	  this	  list	  include	  facilitation	  of	  negotiations	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  Colombia	  and	  The	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Colombia	  (FARC),	  and	  peacebuilding	  efforts	  in	  conflict-­‐affected	  areas	  in	  Burma/Myanmar.	  	  	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  has	  received	  recognition	  from	  Western	  allies	  and	  international	  development	  organizations,	  but	  Norway	  has	  also	  come	  under	  strong	  criticism.	  While	  the	  initial	  success	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process	  created	  optimism	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  peace,	  the	  subsequent	  lack	  of	  substantive	  conflict	  resolution	  raised	  serious	  doubts	  about	  Norway’s	  capability	  as	  a	  relatively	  powerless	  mediator	  in	  a	  situation	  with	  strong	  asymmetry	  between	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the	  conflict	  protagonists	  (Said	  2001;	  Waage	  2005,	  2007).	  Norway	  has	  also	  come	  under	  criticism	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  for	  trying	  to	  impose	  an	  international	  liberal	  peace	  agenda	  and	  for	  being	  unable	  to	  effectively	  address	  the	  contextual	  complexity	  of	  political	  actors	  and	  dynamics	  (Goodhand,	  Klem	  and	  Sørbø	  2011;	  Liyanage	  2008;	  Stokke	  and	  Uyangoda	  2011).	  More	  recently,	  Norwegian	  peacebuilding	  has	  received	  critical	  attention	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  where	  Norway	  is	  seen	  as	  working	  closely	  with	  the	  government	  while	  lessening	  its	  links	  to	  national	  minorities	  and	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  movement.	  Norway’s	  engagement	  in	  both	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Burma/Myanmar	  has	  also	  been	  criticized	  for	  being	  narrow	  peacebuilding	  initiatives	  with	  weak	  strategic	  links	  to	  substantive	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  political	  transformations.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Key	  cases	  of	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  after	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  Norway’s	  role	  in	  Israel/Palestine,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Burma/Myanmar	  and	  elsewhere	  raise	  a	  set	  of	  critical	  questions	  about	  why	  a	  small	  state	  engages	  in	  intrastate	  conflicts	  where	  it	  has	  no	  obvious	  strategic	  interests;	  how	  such	  engagement	  is	  constructed	  discursively	  and	  institutionalized	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  and;	  how	  the	  discourses	  and	  practices	  of	  peace	  engagement	  are	  being	  transformed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  changing	  international	  relations.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  the	  article	  is	  organized	  in	  four	  sections,	  where	  the	  first	  provides	  a	  brief	  review	  of	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studies	  of	  small	  states	  in	  international	  relations.	  This	  is	  followed,	  in	  the	  second	  section,	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  discursive	  construction	  of	  Norway’s	  international	  interests,	  focusing	  especially	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  in	  the	  1990s.	  The	  third	  section	  examines	  how	  the	  discourse	  on	  peace	  engagement	  is	  translated	  into	  practical	  strategies	  for	  liberal	  peacebuilding.	  Finally,	  the	  fourth	  section	  provides	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  changing	  international	  relations	  have	  transformed	  Norway’s	  foreign	  policy	  and	  peace	  engagement	  in	  a	  more	  realist	  direction.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Norway’	  foreign	  policy	  discourses	  and	  practices	  in	  a	  changing	  international	  context.	  	  	  Figure	  2	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  article’s	  analytical	  structure	  and	  findings.	  The	  core	  argument	  is	  that	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  emerged	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  international	  idealism	  stemming	  from	  domestic	  political	  constellations,	  but	  has	  become	  a	  form	  of	  interest-­‐based	  foreign	  policy	  that	  is	  reflective	  of	  changing	  international	  relations.	  As	  the	  international	  political	  space	  for	  liberal	  peacebuilding	  widened	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  peace	  engagement	  became	  a	  prioritized	  foreign	  policy,	  initially	  conceived	  as	  value-­‐based	  promotion	  of	  peaceful	  coexistence,	  but	  gradually	  also	  as	  a	  means	  to	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enhance	  Norway’s	  standing,	  relevance	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  politics.	  The	  article	  also	  argues	  that	  changing	  international	  relations	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  has	  furthered	  this	  reorientation	  of	  idealist	  engagement	  politics	  in	  a	  realist	  direction.	  Whereas	  Norway’s	  role	  in	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  illustrates	  the	  hegemony	  of	  liberal	  peacebuilding	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  Norway’s	  on-­‐going	  engagement	  in	  peacebuilding	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  demonstrates	  this	  realist	  framing	  of	  peace	  engagement.	  	  	  The	  article	  is	  based	  on	  the	  author’s	  close	  attention	  to	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  for	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  as	  an	  observer	  and	  occasional	  commentator	  in	  Norway,	  and	  as	  a	  researcher	  on	  politics	  of	  peace	  and	  democracy	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  since	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  since	  2010.	  The	  analysis	  also	  draws	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  textual	  sources	  (mass	  media,	  policy	  documents	  and	  political	  debates)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  interviews	  and	  conversations	  with	  key	  observers	  and	  actors	  in	  Norway,	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Burma/Myanmar.	  	  	  	  
Small	  States	  in	  International	  Relations	  	  Studies	  of	  international	  relations	  have	  traditionally	  been	  state-­‐	  and	  security-­‐centred	  fields	  that	  have	  given	  prime	  attention	  to	  “great	  powers”	  rather	  than	  micro,	  small	  or	  middle	  states	  (Ingebritsen,	  Neumann,	  Gstöhl	  and	  Beyer	  2006;	  Nayak	  and	  Selbin	  2010).	  Although	  the	  period	  since	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  has	  been	  marked	  by	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  small	  states,	  especially	  due	  to	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  European	  colonial	  empires	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  matched	  by	  scholarly	  attention	  to	  the	  roles	  and	  strategies	  of	  small	  states	  in	  international	  relations	  (Steinmetz	  and	  Wivel	  2010).	  Neumann	  and	  Gstöhl	  (2006)	  explain	  this	  paradoxical	  situation	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  overall	  primacy	  of	  security	  studies,	  the	  preoccupation	  with	  superpower	  rivalry	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  realism	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  all	  supporting	  prime	  attention	  to	  dominant	  powers	  in	  a	  bipolar	  world	  order.	  Small	  states	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  residual	  category	  and	  their	  smallness	  has	  typically	  been	  equated	  with	  weakness	  and	  irrelevance,	  despite	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examples	  of	  small	  states	  holding	  significant	  issue-­‐specific	  power,	  for	  example	  as	  international	  financial	  hubs	  or	  as	  suppliers	  of	  key	  resources.	  	  	  While	  relative	  neglect	  of	  small	  states	  has	  been	  the	  dominant	  tendency,	  it	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  period	  from	  the	  1950s	  to	  the	  1970s	  did	  produce	  some	  notable	  exceptions	  to	  this	  general	  pattern.	  Following	  the	  pioneer	  work	  of	  Fox	  (1959)	  there	  has	  been	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  of	  how	  small	  states	  have	  used	  strategic	  alignments	  to	  compensate	  for	  limited	  capability	  to	  safeguard	  their	  own	  security	  (Keohane	  1969;	  Rothstein	  1968).	  Norway’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  to	  defend	  its	  sovereignty	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  is	  only	  one	  example	  of	  this	  (Holst	  1985;	  Udgaard	  1973).	  It	  should	  also	  be	  mentioned	  that	  there	  was	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  systematically	  examined	  state	  size	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  both	  economic	  performance	  and	  behaviour	  in	  international	  politics	  (Baehr	  1975).	  Neumann	  and	  Gstöhl	  (2006)	  observe,	  however,	  that	  most	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  that	  were	  generated	  about	  the	  determining	  role	  of	  state	  size	  has	  been	  proven	  to	  be	  wrong	  and	  that	  the	  realist/neo-­‐realist	  perspectives	  have	  provided	  few	  analytical	  alternatives	  to	  the	  deterministic	  focus	  on	  state	  size,	  thus	  creating	  an	  analytical	  impasse	  and	  decline	  in	  interest	  for	  small	  states	  after	  the	  1970s.	  	  Post-­‐realist	  perspectives	  and	  debates	  within	  international	  relations	  –	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism	  and	  social	  constructivism	  –	  have,	  in	  contrast,	  provided	  new	  analytical	  opportunities	  for	  studying	  small	  states	  in	  international	  politics.	  Neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  has	  brought	  attention	  to	  the	  increased	  importance	  of	  regional	  and	  international	  organizations	  in	  the	  context	  of	  increased	  international	  interdependence	  (e.g.	  the	  European	  Union).	  Such	  organizations	  have	  produced	  new	  arenas	  and	  opportunities	  for	  non-­‐dominant	  actors	  to	  pursue	  their	  international	  interests,	  while	  being	  attentive	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  engagement	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  jeopardizing	  their	  sovereignty.	  The	  growth	  of	  international	  organizations	  thus	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  realist	  assumption	  that	  smallness	  is	  equated	  with	  weakness	  in	  international	  relations	  (Steinmetz	  and	  Wivel	  2010).	  Social	  constructivism,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  brought	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  identity,	  ideas	  and	  norms	  in	  international	  relations	  (Wendt	  1999).	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The	  emphasis	  here	  is	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  identities	  and	  interests	  in	  small	  states	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  institutionalized	  foreign	  policy	  in	  regard	  to	  different	  arenas	  of	  world	  politics,	  including	  discursive	  politics	  such	  as	  norm	  entrepreneurship	  in	  international	  relations	  (Ingebritsen	  2006).	  	  	  The	  three	  approaches	  to	  small	  state	  studies	  that	  have	  been	  mentioned	  above	  –	  realism/neo-­‐realism,	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism	  and	  social	  constructivism	  –	  have	  failed	  to	  produce	  a	  vibrant	  field	  of	  small	  state	  studies,	  but	  nevertheless	  provided	  analytical	  pointers	  for	  empirical	  investigations.	  While	  the	  realist/neo-­‐realist	  notion	  of	  capability	  overstates	  the	  links	  between	  state	  smallness	  and	  weakness,	  it	  draws	  critical	  attention	  to	  power	  imbalances	  and	  the	  associated	  strategies	  of	  alignment.	  Likewise,	  the	  focus	  on	  international	  institutions	  points	  to	  the	  diversification	  of	  spaces	  and	  strategies	  for	  small	  state	  politics.	  Finally,	  the	  focus	  on	  political	  discourse	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  constructions	  of	  identities	  and	  interests	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  understanding	  strategies.	  	  The	  present	  article	  is	  especially	  informed	  by	  social	  constructivism	  and	  its	  focus	  on	  discursive	  politics.	  Discourse	  analysis	  examines	  how	  socially	  constructed	  meaning	  frames	  political	  processes;	  thereby	  making	  some	  political	  practices	  seem	  legitimate	  and	  necessary	  while	  precluding	  others	  (Jørgensen	  and	  Phillips	  2002;	  Torfing	  1999).	  A	  discourse	  constitutes	  a	  temporary	  fixing	  of	  meaning	  built	  around	  relatively	  stable	  nodal	  points	  and	  chains	  of	  equivalence,	  but	  discourses	  are	  never	  completely	  fixed	  and	  there	  are	  always	  spaces	  for	  contestation	  even	  when	  there	  is	  considerable	  inertia	  to	  change	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  1985).	  Discourses	  define	  political	  spaces	  by	  normalizing	  and	  legitimizing	  certain	  kinds	  of	  practices,	  but	  discourses	  may	  also	  be	  altered	  through	  alternative	  practices.	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  for	  the	  present	  article	  is	  that	  it	  highlights	  that	  Norway’s	  peace	  diplomacy	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  discursive	  representation	  of	  Norway’s	  identity,	  interests	  and	  international	  context.	  It	  also	  points	  to	  the	  inseparability	  of	  discourse	  and	  practice,	  for	  example	  between	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  and	  peacebuilding	  strategies.	  Based	  on	  these	  general	  observations,	  the	  following	  section	  will	  briefly	  examine	  the	  construction	  of	  Norway’s	  international	  interests	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before	  turning	  to	  the	  specific	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  	  
Norway’s	  Small	  State	  Identity	  and	  International	  Context	  	  Why	  does	  a	  small	  state	  like	  Norway	  engage	  in	  resolution	  of	  distant	  intrastate	  conflicts	  where	  it	  has	  no	  immediate	  economic	  or	  strategic	  interests?	  The	  dominant	  discourse	  on	  peace	  engagement	  in	  Norway,	  especially	  in	  the	  1990s,	  holds	  that	  peace	  engagement	  is	  an	  altruistic	  contribution	  towards	  a	  better	  world	  by	  a	  peaceful	  nation	  that	  has	  the	  values,	  competence	  and	  economic	  resources	  to	  do	  so.	  A	  second	  discourse,	  which	  has	  become	  more	  prominent	  in	  recent	  years,	  holds	  that	  peace	  engagement	  may	  also	  be	  beneficial	  for	  Norway’s	  own	  interests,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  contribution	  to	  peace	  as	  a	  global	  public	  good	  (Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  2009a,	  2009b;	  Thune	  and	  Lunde	  2013).	  These	  contrasting	  representations	  indicate	  that	  understanding	  Norway’s	  engagement	  politics	  requires	  analytical	  attention	  to	  the	  discursive	  construction	  of	  its	  identity,	  interests	  and	  international	  context,	  and	  how	  these	  have	  changed	  over	  time.	  	  	  
A	  small	  state	  in	  a	  changing	  world	  The	  most	  striking	  nodal	  point	  in	  foreign	  policy	  discourse	  in	  Norway	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  the	  centrality	  of	  “smallness”	  and	  “vulnerability”	  (Leira	  2007;	  Riste	  2001).	  The	  core	  argument	  was	  that	  the	  smallness	  of	  Norway	  means	  that	  it	  has	  limited	  influence	  on	  international	  relations	  that	  affect	  its	  security	  and	  economic	  development	  while	  Norway’s	  peripheral	  but	  geostrategic	  location	  in	  Northern	  Europe	  adds	  to	  its	  vulnerability.	  The	  smallness	  and	  vulnerability	  of	  Norway	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  making	  it	  both	  possible	  and	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  political	  consensus	  on	  foreign	  policy,	  particularly	  on	  questions	  of	  security	  and	  alliance	  politics	  (Kjølberg	  2007;	  Riste	  2001).	  	  	  The	  identity	  as	  a	  small	  and	  vulnerable	  state	  has	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  framing	  Norwegian	  foreign	  policy.	  Riste	  (2001)	  identifies	  three	  general	  positions	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Norway’s	  foreign	  policy	  –	  neutralism,	  idealism	  (or	  “moralism”)	  and	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realism	  –	  that	  have	  all	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  interests	  and	  vulnerabilities	  of	  the	  small	  state.	  While	  neutralism	  is	  a	  defensive	  withdrawal	  from	  international	  power	  politics,	  idealism	  and	  realism	  seek	  to	  overcome	  the	  perceived	  lack	  of	  power	  by	  pursuing	  influence	  through	  value	  diplomacy	  or	  participation	  in	  alliance	  politics.	  Neutralism	  was	  especially	  prominent	  in	  the	  early	  period	  after	  independence	  in	  1905,	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  safeguard	  both	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  new	  state	  and	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  Norway’s	  shipping	  industry.	  Idealism	  gained	  a	  prominent	  position	  in	  the	  period	  between	  the	  two	  world	  wars	  when	  Norway’s	  support	  for	  international	  cooperation	  reflected	  both	  international	  idealism	  at	  the	  time	  and	  the	  domestic	  politics	  of	  social	  movements	  and	  political	  parties	  (Knutsen,	  Sørbø	  and	  Gjerdåker	  1995;	  Leira	  2002).	  Realism	  became	  the	  dominant	  position	  during	  and	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  when	  Norway	  became	  a	  partner	  in	  US-­‐led	  alliance	  politics,	  especially	  through	  NATO	  (Holst	  1985;	  Udgaard	  1973).	  	  	  Although	  different	  periods	  have	  been	  marked	  by	  the	  dominance	  of	  one	  of	  these	  positions,	  Norway’s	  foreign	  policy	  is	  also	  characterized	  by	  a	  co-­‐existence	  of	  elements	  from	  all	  three.	  This	  is	  also	  true	  for	  the	  contemporary	  period,	  when	  popular	  concerns	  about	  self-­‐determination	  have	  kept	  Norway	  outside	  the	  European	  Union	  while	  realism	  has	  made	  Norway	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  European	  economic	  collaboration	  (Østerud	  2005).	  Likewise,	  there	  is	  a	  balancing	  act	  between	  idealism	  and	  realism	  in	  Norway’s	  participation	  in	  international	  security	  politics,	  most	  clearly	  seen	  in	  the	  paradox	  that	  Norway	  has	  pursued	  a	  role	  as	  international	  peace	  promoter	  and	  simultaneously	  participated	  in	  international	  military	  operations	  (Harpviken	  and	  Skjelsbræk	  2010;	  Rottem	  2007).	  These	  and	  other	  examples	  show	  that	  Norwegian	  foreign	  policy	  has	  been	  marked	  by	  a	  shifting	  and	  uneasy	  coexistence	  of	  realism,	  idealism	  and	  neutralism,	  producing	  foreign	  policies	  that	  seem	  contradictory	  but	  may	  also	  accommodate	  diverse	  domestic	  interests	  and	  maintain	  overall	  foreign	  policy	  consensus	  (Riste	  2001).	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  inter-­‐party	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  for	  inter-­‐party	  consensus	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  given	  Norway’s	  perceived	  smallness	  and	  vulnerability.	  Concessions	  to	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  Socialists	  on	  questions	  of	  North/South	  collaboration	  thus	  emerged	  as	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achieving	  inter-­‐party	  consensus	  on	  Norway’s	  integration	  in	  US-­‐led	  security	  politics	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	  balance	  between	  idealism	  and	  realism	  has	  shifted	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Norway’s	  foreign	  policy	  was	  characterized	  by	  the	  dominance	  of	  realist	  security	  politics	  over	  idealist	  value	  diplomacy	  (Græger	  and	  Leira	  2005;	  Matlary	  2002).	  This	  changed	  in	  the	  1990s	  when	  ideals	  and	  soft	  power	  diplomacy	  gained	  new	  prominence	  internationally	  (Melissen	  2005;	  Nye	  2004).	  This	  shift	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  reduced	  security	  threats	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  but	  also	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  international	  institutions	  and	  laws	  as	  well	  as	  increased	  public	  openness	  and	  debate	  on	  foreign	  policy.	  Such	  changes	  widened	  the	  space	  for	  small	  states	  in	  international	  relations,	  reducing	  the	  security	  imperative	  while	  facilitating	  public	  diplomacy	  and	  norm	  entrepreneurship	  (Ingebritsen	  2006).	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  Norway’s	  changing	  combination	  of	  security	  and	  value	  diplomacy.	  Norway’s	  general	  foreign	  policy	  orientation	  has	  thus	  shifted	  from	  a	  strong	  primacy	  of	  realism	  and	  territorial	  sovereignty	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  a	  broader	  and	  less	  territorial	  notion	  of	  security	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  period	  (Græger	  and	  Leira	  2005;	  Heier	  2006;	  Lange,	  Pharo	  and	  Østerud	  2009;	  Matlary	  and	  Østerud	  2007).	  Simultaneously,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  value	  diplomacy.	  Engagement	  politics,	  which	  started	  from	  humanitarian	  assistance	  and	  development	  cooperation,	  has	  been	  widened	  to	  include	  peace	  facilitation	  and	  peacebuilding	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  and	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  (Matlary	  2002;	  Skånland	  2008;	  Østerud	  2006).	  	  	  The	  shifting	  balance	  between	  security	  and	  value	  diplomacy	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  changes	  at	  the	  level	  of	  identity	  discourse.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  small	  state	  identity	  has	  been	  modified	  by	  new	  assertions	  about	  Norway	  as	  a	  major	  actor	  in	  certain	  sectors.	  While	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  Norway	  is	  small	  in	  terms	  of	  population	  size	  (approximately	  5	  millions),	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  it	  has	  disproportionate	  strength	  in	  other	  aspects	  (e.g.	  the	  international	  position	  in	  shipping,	  oil	  and	  seafood)	  (Lunde	  et.al.	  2008;	  Rottem	  and	  Hønneland	  2008).	  In	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  context	  it	  has	  been	  increasingly	  recognized	  that	  this	  both	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means	  that	  Norway	  has	  interests	  that	  extend	  far	  beyond	  its	  territorial	  borders	  and	  that	  positions	  of	  power	  in	  specific	  sectors	  may	  also	  provide	  influence	  in	  other	  areas.	  Norway’s	  construction	  of	  itself	  as	  a	  “humanitarian	  power”	  and	  “peace	  nation”	  in	  the	  1990s	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  effort	  by	  a	  small	  state	  to	  choose	  its	  size	  and	  shape	  its	  standing	  and	  leverage	  in	  international	  relations	  (Østerud	  2006).	  	  	  
The	  Norwegian	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  The	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  value	  diplomacy	  in	  Norwegian	  foreign	  policy	  in	  general	  runs	  parallel	  to	  a	  more	  specific	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1990s.	  This	  discourse	  revolves	  around	  the	  claims	  that	  Norway	  in	  values	  and	  practices	  is	  a	  “peace	  nation”;	  that	  Norway	  has	  distinct	  qualifications	  and	  strategies	  for	  peace	  engagement;	  and,	  that	  peace	  engagement	  promotes	  Norwegian	  values	  and	  interests	  (Skånland	  2008).	  First,	  the	  identity	  as	  a	  “peace	  nation”	  is	  primarily	  based	  on	  contemporary	  peace	  engagement,	  starting	  with	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process,	  but	  references	  are	  also	  made	  to	  the	  “Nansen	  legacy”	  of	  international	  humanitarianism	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  1920s.	  Second,	  the	  claims	  about	  Norway’s	  competence	  are	  justified	  with	  reference	  to	  Norway’s	  performance	  in	  various	  peace	  processes.	  A	  more	  analytical	  foundation	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  a	  book	  by	  Jan	  Egeland	  (1988)	  entitled	  “Impotent	  Superpower	  –	  
Potent	  Small	  State”.	  Egeland	  argues	  that	  Norway	  has	  advantages	  and	  under-­‐utilized	  potential	  for	  humanitarian	  interventions	  and	  human	  rights	  advocacy,	  most	  notably:	  a	  broad	  political	  consensus	  on	  foreign	  policy;	  few	  conflicting	  foreign	  policy	  interests;	  and	  available	  funds	  for	  foreign	  assistance.	  Institutional	  capability	  is	  identified	  as	  another	  precondition,	  but	  this	  was	  found	  to	  be	  less	  developed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing.	  Egeland	  argued,	  however,	  that	  this	  could	  be	  changed	  through	  strategic	  interventions	  to	  build	  expertise	  and	  develop	  close	  ties	  between	  the	  state,	  NGOs	  and	  academic	  institutions.	  These	  ideas	  shaped	  Norway’s	  approach	  to	  peace	  in	  the	  1990s,	  when	  Egeland	  played	  a	  key	  role	  as	  State	  Secretary	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  from	  1990	  to	  1997.	  Third,	  the	  argument	  that	  peace	  engagement	  reflects	  and	  benefits	  Norwegian	  values	  and	  interests	  is	  developed	  in	  a	  series	  of	  Government	  reports	  to	  Parliament	  on	  development	  assistance	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  reports	  from	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	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early	  1990s	  and	  the	  broader	  political	  discourse	  around	  them	  introduced	  peace	  as	  a	  goal	  for	  development	  cooperation;	  broadened	  the	  concept	  of	  security	  and	  linked	  security	  to	  global	  challenges	  of	  under-­‐development,	  and;	  argued	  that	  Norway	  could	  play	  a	  lead	  role	  in	  foreign	  policy	  areas	  where	  it	  has	  expertise	  and	  resources	  (Ministry	  of	  Development	  Cooperation	  1987;	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  1989,	  1992).	  Subsequent	  reports	  and	  political	  debates	  have	  endorsed	  peace	  engagement	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  values,	  but	  have	  also	  presented	  value	  diplomacy	  as	  part	  of	  Norway’s	  interest	  politics	  (Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  1995;	  2004;	  2009a;	  2009b).	  	  The	  development	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  peace	  discourse	  involved	  a	  number	  of	  actors	  and	  arenas.	  Skånland	  (2008)	  observes	  for	  example	  that	  mass	  media	  played	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  popularizing	  peace	  engagement.	  After	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  in	  1993,	  Norwegian	  mass	  media	  gave	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process,	  largely	  conveying	  the	  actors’	  own	  stories.	  The	  overall	  narrative	  was	  about	  the	  critical	  importance	  and	  remarkable	  success	  of	  Norway’s	  peace	  diplomacy,	  reaffirmed	  by	  reports	  of	  international	  praise.	  The	  message	  was	  that	  a	  small	  state	  had	  achieved	  what	  more	  powerful	  states,	  especially	  USA,	  had	  failed	  to	  do.	  In	  explaining	  this	  success	  the	  media	  emphasized	  the	  close	  personal	  contacts	  and	  trust	  between	  the	  peace	  facilitators	  and	  the	  key	  actors	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	  Norway’s	  impartiality	  and	  lack	  of	  self-­‐interests.	  It	  was	  also	  observed	  that	  successful	  facilitation	  was	  followed	  by	  international	  recognition	  that	  could	  benefit	  Norwegian	  interests,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  representation	  of	  Norway	  as	  an	  altruistic	  peace	  nation.	  Finally,	  it	  was	  commonly	  argued	  that	  Norway	  could	  repeat	  its	  success	  in	  other	  conflict	  situations,	  using	  the	  same	  approach	  to	  peace	  that	  had	  been	  applied	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  	  	  The	  new	  discourse	  on	  peace	  engagement	  was	  further	  developed	  through	  political	  speeches	  and	  Government	  reports	  to	  Parliament	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  (Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  1995,	  2004).	  Peace	  engagement	  now	  emerged	  as	  a	  prioritized	  field	  within	  development	  cooperation,	  and	  the	  political	  basis	  for	  peace	  engagement	  was	  broadened	  across	  the	  spectre	  of	  political	  parties.	  Peace	  facilitation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  originated	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from	  Labour	  Party	  governments	  (1990-­‐1997).	  There	  was	  some	  initial	  contestation	  from	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  but	  this	  opposition	  was	  relatively	  subdued.	  Peace	  engagement	  was	  instead	  adopted	  and	  furthered	  by	  non-­‐socialist	  coalition	  governments	  (1997-­‐2000	  and	  2001-­‐2005).	  It	  was	  also	  a	  prominent	  part	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  recent	  “red-­‐green”	  coalition	  government	  (2005-­‐2013)	  and	  has	  been	  continued	  by	  the	  conservative	  coalition	  government	  that	  has	  held	  power	  since	  2013.	  This	  means	  that	  all	  seven	  parties	  that	  are	  currently	  represented	  in	  Parliament	  have	  participated	  in	  government	  coalitions	  that	  have	  endorsed	  peace	  engagement.	  This	  shows	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  engagement	  politics	  has	  become	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  inter-­‐party	  foreign	  policy	  consensus.	  	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  engagement	  politics	  benefit	  Norwegian	  interests	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  debate,	  with	  changing	  positions	  over	  time.	  Early	  representations	  of	  peace	  engagement	  in	  media,	  political	  documents	  and	  speeches	  emphasized	  solidarity	  and	  altruism	  as	  the	  sole	  motivation	  for	  peace	  engagement.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  values	  and	  idealism	  was	  challenged	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  which	  argued	  that	  peace	  engagement	  would	  take	  attention	  away	  from	  “real”	  security	  interests	  in	  the	  North	  Atlantic.	  The	  counter	  argument	  that	  was	  developed	  by	  the	  Labour	  Party	  held	  that	  peace	  engagement	  actually	  benefits	  such	  interests	  because	  it	  contributes	  to	  a	  more	  peaceful	  and	  well-­‐regulated	  world	  order.	  Furthermore,	  peace	  engagement	  also	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  international	  recognition,	  and	  thus	  an	  indirect	  strategy	  for	  promoting	  Norwegian	  interests	  in	  international	  arenas	  (Matlary	  2002).	  The	  discourse	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1990s	  thus	  gradually	  converged	  around	  the	  position	  that	  peace	  engagement	  is	  motivated	  by	  both	  idealism	  and	  realism,	  with	  no	  major	  conflict	  between	  them	  (Liland	  and	  Kjerland	  2003;	  Støre	  2008).	  This	  merging	  of	  security	  and	  value	  diplomacy	  brought	  peace	  engagement	  centre	  stage	  in	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  1990s,	  but	  also	  prepared	  the	  ground	  for	  realist	  co-­‐optation	  of	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  a	  decade	  later.	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Norway’s	  Approach	  to	  Peace	  Engagement	  	  Given	  the	  discourses	  on	  foreign	  policy	  and	  peace	  that	  were	  outlined	  above,	  the	  next	  question	  is	  how	  these	  are	  translated	  into	  strategies	  for	  peace	  promotion?	  What	  kind	  of	  peace	  is	  being	  pursued	  and	  what	  are	  the	  means	  for	  achieving	  it?	  Starting	  with	  the	  aims,	  it	  can	  be	  observed	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  peace	  is	  implicit	  rather	  than	  explicit,	  but	  Norway’s	  approach	  reflects	  the	  international	  hegemony	  of	  liberal	  peace.	  Richmond	  observes	  that	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  have	  seen	  a	  general	  convergence	  around	  a	  liberal	  and	  technocratic	  understanding	  of	  peacebuilding,	  in	  which	  ‘conflict	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  solved	  and	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  export	  the	  liberal	  peace’	  (2007:	  85).	  The	  case	  for	  liberal	  peace	  is	  based	  on	  the	  thesis	  that	  political	  and	  economic	  liberalism	  are	  conducive	  to	  both	  interstate	  and	  intrastate	  peace,	  making	  liberal	  democracy	  and	  neo-­‐liberal	  development	  the	  universal	  panacea	  for	  ending	  conflict.	  While	  earlier	  discourses	  and	  strategies	  for	  liberal	  peace	  prioritized	  democracy	  promotion,	  contemporary	  peacebuilding	  processes	  are	  characterized	  by	  a	  primacy	  of	  developmentalism	  and	  especially	  promotion	  of	  market-­‐led	  growth.	  Justifications	  for	  interventions	  are	  provided	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  “development-­‐peace	  nexus”,	  where	  development	  failure	  is	  seen	  as	  both	  cause	  and	  effect	  of	  conflict	  and	  human	  insecurity	  (Duffield	  2007).	  Breaking	  conflict	  traps	  through	  neo-­‐liberal	  development	  has	  thus	  become	  a	  key	  concern	  for	  development	  cooperation	  by	  international	  organizations	  and	  aid	  donor	  states	  (Collier	  et.al.	  2003).	  	  A	  world	  order	  comprising	  stable,	  market-­‐friendly	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  states	  and	  peacebuilding	  through	  neoliberal	  developmentalism	  have	  become	  the	  principal	  aims	  and	  means	  for	  international	  peace	  engagement	  (Paris	  2004).	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  intervention	  strategies,	  Richmond	  and	  Franks	  (2009)	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  conservative	  and	  orthodox	  approaches	  to	  ending	  conflict.	  Whereas	  the	  conservative	  approach	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  use	  of	  military	  means	  to	  achieve	  a	  victor’s	  peace,	  the	  orthodox	  model	  seeks	  to	  build	  liberal	  governance	  and	  governmentality	  by	  way	  of	  political	  negotiations	  and	  institutional	  reforms.	  Richmond	  and	  Franks	  observe	  that	  ‘entry	  into	  a	  conflict	  zone	  is	  often	  predicted	  on	  a	  conservative	  version	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace,	  with	  the	  aspiration	  of	  moving	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towards	  the	  orthodox	  graduation’	  (2009:	  11),	  but	  they	  find	  few	  examples	  of	  successful	  transitions	  from	  a	  military	  initial	  approach	  to	  implementation	  of	  the	  political	  approach.	  The	  orthodox	  approach,	  in	  contrast,	  prioritizes	  negotiated	  settlements	  but	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  hard	  power	  in	  the	  face	  of	  protracted	  armed	  conflicts	  and	  has	  to	  rely	  on	  “ripe	  moments”	  in	  which	  the	  warring	  parties	  find	  it	  meaningful	  to	  pursue	  political	  rather	  than	  military	  strategies.	  	  	  
Crafting	  (neo-­‐)	  liberal	  peace	  Norway’s	  approach	  to	  peace	  reflects	  the	  international	  hegemony	  of	  liberal	  peace	  and	  especially	  the	  orthodox	  approach	  to	  peacebuilding.	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  in	  the	  1990s	  was	  framed	  by	  a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  unipolar	  world	  order	  marked	  by	  US	  liberal	  internationalism.	  Intrastate	  conflicts	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  this	  liberal	  world	  order	  was	  the	  prevalent	  conflict	  type	  and	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  development	  failure.	  This	  provided	  a	  widened	  space	  for	  Norway,	  as	  an	  aid	  donor	  with	  a	  “peace	  nation”	  identity	  and	  close	  links	  to	  the	  US,	  to	  play	  a	  disproportionally	  large	  role	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  	  The	  Norwegian	  approach	  that	  emerged	  in	  this	  context	  revolves	  around	  facilitating	  dialog,	  funding	  peacebuilding,	  and	  coordinating	  networks	  of	  “like-­‐minded”	  actors	  to	  promote	  negotiated	  transitions	  to	  liberal	  peace.	  The	  design	  of	  peace	  processes	  where	  Norway	  plays	  a	  role	  varies	  according	  to	  contextual	  constellations	  and	  dynamics,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  striking	  similarities	  that	  indicate	  a	  structuring	  effect	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  approach.	  Norway	  has	  developed	  an	  approach	  to	  peace	  where	  the	  basic	  building	  blocks	  are:	  invited	  facilitation	  of	  political	  negotiations	  rather	  than	  interventionist	  peace	  making;	  an	  emphasis	  on	  dialog	  with	  the	  protagonists	  based	  on	  parity	  of	  status	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  third-­‐party	  impartiality;	  instrumental,	  flexible,	  and	  long-­‐term	  use	  of	  humanitarian	  and	  development	  aid	  to	  facilitate	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peacebuilding;	  and,	  implementation	  of	  humanitarian	  rehabilitation	  and	  development	  for	  peacebuilding	  through	  partnerships	  between	  state	  authorities,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  and	  multilateral	  aid	  agencies	  (Höglund	  and	  Svensson	  2011;	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  2009a,	  2009b).	  	  	  
 16	  
Norway’s	  approach	  assigns	  prime	  responsibility	  to	  the	  protagonists	  while	  placing	  Norway	  in	  a	  role	  as	  facilitating	  third	  party	  with	  limited	  power	  to	  define	  the	  process	  or	  outcome	  of	  negotiations	  (Höglund	  and	  Svensson	  2011).	  While	  this	  leaves	  the	  facilitator	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  warring	  parties	  and	  powerful	  international	  stakeholders,	  it	  may	  also	  give	  the	  facilitator	  the	  freedom	  to	  disclaim	  responsibility	  in	  the	  case	  of	  failed	  peace	  processes.	  It	  can	  for	  example	  be	  observed	  that	  Norway	  has	  received	  international	  recognition	  for	  its	  peace	  engagement	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  despite	  the	  failed	  peace	  process.	  The	  explanation	  for	  this	  paradox	  is	  that	  the	  ownership	  of	  peace	  and	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  resumption	  and	  conduct	  of	  war	  was	  put	  on	  the	  warring	  parties	  themselves,	  while	  Norway	  could	  be	  portrayed	  as	  a	  dedicated	  and	  patient	  third	  party.	  The	  counterpoint	  presented	  by	  critical	  scholars	  and	  political	  actors,	  especially	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  is	  that	  the	  Norwegian	  approach	  was	  an	  important	  factor	  behind	  the	  failed	  process	  and	  the	  subsequent	  resumption	  of	  war	  (Goodhand,	  Klem	  and	  Sørbø	  2011;	  Stokke	  and	  Uyangoda	  2011).	  	  It	  can	  be	  observed	  that	  peace	  processes	  where	  Norway	  plays	  a	  prominent	  role	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  achieving	  peace	  deals	  rather	  than	  comprehensive	  political	  reforms	  for	  substantive	  democracy	  (Stokke	  and	  Uyangoda	  2011;	  Waage	  2005).	  Norwegian	  peace	  processes	  are	  often	  narrow	  also	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  confined	  to	  formal	  negotiations	  between	  warring	  parties.	  Organized	  parallel	  negotiations	  between	  different	  factions	  of	  the	  political	  elite	  or	  among	  civil	  society	  actors	  are	  uncommon.	  Likewise,	  it	  can	  be	  observed	  that	  although	  Norway	  often	  pledges	  long-­‐term	  commitment,	  the	  peace	  processes	  are	  typically	  characterized	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  achieve	  quick	  results	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ceasefires	  and	  peace	  agreements.	  Finally,	  it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  peace	  processes	  that	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  Norwegian	  approach	  tend	  to	  be	  strongly	  internationalized,	  even	  though	  Norway	  upholds	  the	  principle	  of	  local	  peace	  ownership.	  These	  general	  observations	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Norwegian	  approach	  to	  peace	  tends	  to	  prioritize	  elitist	  crafting	  of	  peace	  deals	  more	  than	  structural	  transformations	  towards	  substantive	  democratization	  and	  positive	  peace.	  This	  makes	  the	  Norwegian	  approach	  congruent	  with	  liberal	  peacebuilding	  orthodoxy,	  aiming	  at	  producing	  sovereign	  states	  with	  neo-­‐liberal	  development	  and	  formal	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democracy,	  rather	  than	  an	  emancipatory	  process	  aiming	  at	  positive	  peace	  through	  substantive	  conflict	  transformation	  (Paris	  2004;	  Richmond	  and	  Franks	  2009).	  These	  tendencies	  are	  well	  exemplified	  by	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  in	  Sri	  Lanka.	  	  




Figure	  3.	  Domestic	  and	  international	  actors	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  liberal	  peace	  in	  Sri	  Lanka.	  	  The	  Sri	  Lankan	  conflict	  was	  conducive	  for	  Norway’s	  approach	  to	  peacebuilding.	  The	  conflict	  reached	  a	  stalemate	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  that	  made	  both	  the	  GOSL	  and	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the	  LTTE	  willing	  to	  accept	  a	  ceasefire,	  enter	  into	  political	  negotiations,	  and	  address	  humanitarian	  and	  development	  needs.	  This	  balance	  of	  power	  shaped	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  kept	  the	  ceasefire	  agreement	  in	  place	  until	  changing	  international	  relations	  shifted	  the	  balance	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  government.	  The	  international	  aid	  donors	  were	  committed	  to	  making	  Sri	  Lanka	  a	  showcase	  for	  liberal	  peacebuilding	  and	  found	  like-­‐minded	  partners	  in	  the	  market-­‐friendly	  United	  National	  Party	  government	  and	  in	  the	  network	  around	  LTTE’s	  chief	  negotiator	  (Lunstead	  2007).	  Norway	  was	  found	  to	  be	  an	  acceptable	  facilitator	  by	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  stakeholders,	  producing	  a	  peace	  process	  that	  was	  characterized	  by	  Norway’s	  ownership	  approach,	  actively	  supported	  by	  the	  aid	  donors	  and	  international	  development	  organizations.	  	  	  Höglund	  and	  Svensson	  (2011)	  observe	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  peace	  ownership	  permeated	  the	  process	  and	  determined	  its	  key	  characteristics,	  including	  who	  participated	  at	  the	  negotiation	  table	  and	  which	  issues	  were	  brought	  up	  for	  discussion.	  The	  Norwegian	  peace	  ownership	  approach	  placed	  the	  responsibility	  for	  peace	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  GOSL	  and	  LTTE,	  who	  were	  taken	  to	  represent	  the	  broader	  Sinhalese	  and	  Tamil	  communities.	  Other	  stakeholders	  were	  excluded	  from	  formal	  negotiations	  and	  there	  were	  no	  additional	  process	  aimed	  at	  building	  a	  broader	  consensus	  on	  peace.	  The	  political	  opposition,	  including	  major	  Sinhalese	  parties,	  the	  Muslim	  minority,	  non-­‐LTTE	  Tamil	  actors	  and	  the	  broad	  diversity	  of	  civil	  society	  organizations,	  were	  largely	  excluded	  from	  the	  peace	  process.	  The	  peace	  ownership	  approach,	  therefore,	  made	  the	  dynamics	  and	  outcome	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  highly	  dependent	  on	  the	  positions	  and	  strategies	  of	  the	  protagonists.	  Since	  their	  claims	  to	  political	  legitimacy	  were	  highly	  contested,	  the	  peace	  process	  was	  also	  vulnerable	  to	  oppositional	  politicization	  on	  both	  sides.	  This	  was	  a	  serious	  concern	  due	  to	  the	  factionalized	  and	  ethnicized	  nature	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  Sri	  Lankan	  politics	  (de	  Votta	  2004).	  The	  combination	  of	  the	  GOSL-­‐LTTE	  balance	  of	  power,	  Norway’s	  peace	  ownership	  approach	  and	  entrenched	  political	  obstacles	  to	  conflict	  resolution,	  thus,	  produced	  a	  process	  that	  was	  narrowly	  defined	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  actors	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  were	  discussed	  (Stokke	  and	  Uyangoda	  2011;	  Goodhand,	  Klem	  and	  Sørbø	  2011).	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The	  pragmatic	  strategy	  for	  peace	  that	  emerged	  from	  this	  interplay	  between	  international	  and	  domestic	  preconditions	  was	  to	  postpone	  and	  depoliticize	  rather	  than	  resolve	  the	  core	  political	  issues.	  The	  main	  components	  of	  this	  strategy	  were	  humanitarian	  rehabilitation	  in	  war-­‐affected	  areas	  and	  normalization	  of	  market-­‐led	  development	  throughout	  the	  island.	  The	  negotiations	  were	  largely	  confined	  to	  the	  content	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  ceasefire	  agreement	  and	  to	  humanitarian	  needs,	  while	  state	  reforms	  to	  secure	  minority	  rights,	  devolution	  of	  power	  and	  substantive	  political	  representation	  gained	  less	  attention	  (Stokke	  and	  Uyangoda	  2011).	  This	  strategy	  of	  using	  development	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  peace	  made	  aid	  administration	  a	  main	  point	  of	  contention	  between	  the	  GOSL,	  LTTE	  and	  the	  Sinhalese	  opposition	  as	  it	  came	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  contentious	  questions	  of	  power-­‐sharing	  and	  state	  sovereignty	  (Rainford	  and	  Satkunanathan	  2011;	  Shanmugaratnam	  and	  Stokke	  2008).	  Disagreements	  between	  the	  protagonists	  over	  interim	  administrative	  arrangements	  brought	  the	  negotiations	  to	  a	  stalemate	  and	  provided	  a	  political	  space	  for	  the	  opposition	  to	  mobilize	  against	  the	  peace	  process,	  the	  government	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  international	  actors.	  Subsequent	  attempts	  by	  the	  international	  aid	  donors	  to	  use	  conditionalities	  as	  leverage	  to	  restart	  the	  stalled	  peace	  negotiations	  further	  politicized	  the	  role	  of	  the	  international	  actors,	  and	  especially	  Norwegian	  facilitation.	  	  	  The	  Sri	  Lankan	  peace	  process	  is	  an	  illustrative	  example	  of	  the	  internationalized	  liberal	  peacebuilding	  and	  Norway’s	  approach	  to	  peace	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Falling	  short	  of	  the	  expectations,	  however,	  the	  Sri	  Lankan	  process	  also	  shows	  the	  limitations	  in	  attempts	  to	  negotiate	  a	  peace	  deal	  without	  addressing	  core	  political	  issues	  and	  in	  using	  development	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  substantive	  political	  transformations	  (Bastian	  2007;	  Rainford	  and	  Satkunanathan	  2011;	  Shanmugaratnam	  and	  Stokke	  2008).	  The	  last	  phase	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  when	  the	  GOSL	  and	  the	  LTTE	  returned	  to	  military	  means	  for	  ending	  the	  conflict,	  further	  demonstrated	  the	  limitations	  of	  Norway’s	  approach	  to	  liberal	  peacebuilding.	  The	  GOSL’s	  final	  military	  campaign	  against	  LTTE	  was	  enabled	  by	  changes	  in	  international	  relations	  that	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  strengthen	  its	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  military	  capability.	  Most	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importantly,	  the	  US-­‐led	  “war	  on	  terror”	  provided	  a	  legitimizing	  framework	  for	  labelling,	  proscribing,	  and	  attacking	  the	  LTTE	  as	  a	  “terrorist”	  organization	  (Nadarajah	  and	  Sriskandarajah	  2005).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  growing	  competition	  between	  USA,	  India	  and	  China	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  their	  shared	  emphasis	  on	  state	  security	  created	  opportunities	  for	  acquiring	  military	  hardware,	  training	  and	  intelligence,	  and	  defusing	  international	  demands	  for	  resumed	  negotiations	  and	  protection	  of	  human	  rights.	  These	  changing	  international	  relations	  had	  a	  strong	  negative	  impact	  on	  Norway’s	  role	  as	  facilitator,	  as	  the	  state	  actor	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  the	  legitimate	  right	  to	  use	  violence	  to	  defend	  its	  sovereignty	  and	  security	  against	  terrorist	  insurgents.	  Whereas	  the	  negotiation	  process	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  had	  represented	  an	  internationalization	  of	  peace	  that	  made	  the	  Norwegian	  approach	  highly	  relevant,	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  armed	  conflict	  rendered	  this	  approach	  irrelevant.	  This	  experience,	  in	  turn,	  contributed	  to	  transformations	  in	  Norwegian	  discourses	  and	  practices	  of	  peace	  engagement.	  	  	  	  
Norway’s	  Peace	  Engagement	  in	  a	  Changing	  International	  Context	  	  The	  previous	  sections	  have	  shown	  that	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  and	  strategies	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  bipolar	  world	  order	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  a	  unipolar	  liberal	  world	  order	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  strategic	  adaptation	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  its	  relevance	  and	  leverage	  in	  US-­‐led	  security	  politics	  had	  been	  reduced	  while	  there	  were	  new	  opportunities	  for	  international	  influence	  through	  value	  diplomacy.	  	  	  The	  triumphalist	  belief	  in	  the	  global	  spread	  of	  liberal	  democracy,	  market	  liberalism	  and	  liberal	  peace	  in	  the	  1990s	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  short-­‐lived,	  as	  dramatically	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  al-­‐Qaeda	  attack	  on	  the	  World	  Trade	  Centre	  in	  New	  York	  on	  September	  11,	  2001.	  The	  post-­‐9/11	  period	  has	  produced	  a	  discursive	  shift	  towards	  seeing	  distant	  intrastate	  wars	  as	  global	  security	  threats	  (Kaldor	  2006).	  US	  foreign	  policy,	  as	  the	  foremost	  reference	  point	  for	  Norway’s	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foreign	  affairs,	  underwent	  a	  radical	  transformation	  from	  the	  emphasis	  on	  liberal	  internationalism	  and	  peacebuilding	  during	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  (1993-­‐2001)	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  “homeland	  security”	  and	  “war	  on	  terror”	  under	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  (2001-­‐2009).	  This	  securitization	  of	  peripheral	  conflicts	  shifted	  the	  balance	  in	  favour	  of	  state	  actors	  and	  state	  security	  rather	  than	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  human	  security.	  Insurgency	  movements	  are	  increasingly	  portrayed	  as	  greed-­‐driven	  terrorists	  rather	  than	  grievance-­‐based	  struggles	  for	  justice	  and	  self-­‐determination	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  2001).	  Whereas	  the	  earlier	  representation	  legitimizes	  conflict	  resolution	  through	  political	  negotiations	  between	  state	  actors	  and	  insurgency	  movements,	  current	  discourse	  lends	  support	  to	  military	  interventions	  to	  combat	  terrorism	  and	  enhance	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  security.	  Whereas	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  was	  an	  adaptation	  to	  international	  liberalism	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  shift	  towards	  realism	  and	  the	  conservative	  approach	  to	  ending	  war	  has	  challenged	  Norway’s	  approach	  and	  been	  followed	  by	  adjustments	  in	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  and	  strategies	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  	  	  
Adjustments	  in	  foreign	  policy	  and	  peace	  engagement	  discourse	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  appears	  to	  be	  relatively	  stable.	  Two	  recent	  government	  reports	  to	  Parliament	  on	  foreign	  policy	  and	  development	  cooperation	  confirm	  the	  commitment	  to	  humanitarian	  assistance,	  development	  aid	  and	  peacebuilding,	  without	  announcing	  any	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  content	  of	  engagement	  politics	  (Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  2009a,	  2009b).	  The	  reports	  demonstrate,	  however,	  that	  there	  have	  been	  important	  adjustments	  in	  the	  general	  foreign	  policy	  discourse	  with	  implications	  for	  peace	  engagement.	  	  	  The	  2009	  Government	  report	  on	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  broader	  foreign	  policy	  discourse	  since	  2005,	  are	  characterized	  by	  a	  foregrounding	  of	  Norwegian	  interests	  (Lunde	  et.al.	  2008;	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  2009b;	  Støre	  2008;	  Thune	  and	  Lunde	  2013).	  This	  rehabilitation	  of	  interests	  appears	  to	  signify	  a	  return	  to	  the	  realist	  orientation	  that	  characterized	  the	  Cold	  War	  period,	  but	  this	  is	  only	  partly	  true	  since	  there	  is	  also	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  to	  rethink	  the	  meaning	  of	  interests.	  The	  core	  argument	  is	  that	  globalization	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  multipolar	  world	  order	  means	  that	  the	  nature	  and	  geographic	  reach	  of	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Norwegian	  interests	  have	  undergone	  radical	  changes.	  Pursuing	  Norwegian	  interests	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  confined	  to	  safeguarding	  territorial	  security,	  but	  must	  be	  based	  on	  a	  broader	  concept	  of	  interests,	  both	  thematically	  and	  geographically.	  The	  new	  interest	  politics	  is	  thus	  said	  to	  include	  promotion	  of	  ideals	  as	  well	  as	  state	  security	  and	  transnational	  economic	  interests.	  This	  point	  has	  been	  made	  in	  a	  number	  of	  political	  speeches,	  government	  documents	  and	  media	  reports	  in	  recent	  years	  (Lunde	  et.al.	  2008;	  Støre	  2008;	  Thune	  and	  Lunde	  2013).	  Presenting	  the	  2009	  report	  in	  Parliament,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  stated	  that:	  ‘Norwegian	  real	  political	  interests	  have	  been	  extended	  due	  to	  globalization.	  Norwegian	  engagement	  politics,	  within	  human	  rights,	  aid,	  peace	  and	  reconciliation,	  humanitarian	  efforts,	  are	  ethically	  justified	  but	  in	  addition	  also	  in	  Norway’s	  interest’	  (Støre	  2009,	  own	  translation).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  interest	  has	  become	  the	  foremost	  nodal	  point	  in	  Norwegian	  foreign	  policy	  discourse,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  emphasis	  on	  values	  in	  the	  1990s,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  interest	  has	  been	  broadened	  to	  include	  both	  the	  conventional	  meaning	  of	  interest	  in	  realism	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  value	  within	  idealism.	  Value	  politics	  has	  thus	  been	  institutionalized	  both	  as	  an	  aim	  in	  itself	  and	  as	  a	  means	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  other	  interests	  (Thune	  and	  Lunde	  2013).	  	  This	  discursive	  shift	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  build	  a	  new	  consensus	  on	  Norwegian	  foreign	  policy	  around	  a	  broad	  notion	  of	  Norwegian	  interests	  in	  the	  context	  of	  changing	  international	  relations	  (Græger	  2009).	  Realist	  critics	  of	  this	  new	  consensus	  have	  described	  it	  as	  a	  hollowing	  out	  of	  “real”	  interests,	  while	  idealist	  commentators	  have	  portrayed	  it	  as	  a	  weakening	  of	  value	  politics	  (Harpviken	  and	  Skjelsbræk	  2010;	  Matlary	  2009;	  Toje	  2010).	  Despite	  such	  criticism,	  the	  merging	  of	  realism	  and	  idealism	  seems	  to	  be	  politically	  effective	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  realist	  readjustment	  in	  foreign	  policy	  without	  major	  contestations.	  A	  contributing	  factor	  is	  also	  the	  way	  this	  reorientation	  was	  done,	  as	  a	  participatory	  and	  public	  dialog	  that	  involved	  political	  parties,	  state	  institutions,	  mass	  media,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	  research	  institutions	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  adjustments	  in	  foreign	  policy	  discourse	  were	  already	  embedded	  in	  political	  and	  civil	  society	  by	  the	  time	  the	  2009	  Government	  report	  was	  presented	  to	  Parliament.	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  The	  significance	  of	  this	  new	  realism	  for	  peace	  engagement	  is	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  idealism	  but	  is	  instead	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  Norway’s	  interest	  politics.	  The	  former	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Jonas	  Gahr	  Støre,	  who	  was	  the	  main	  architect	  behind	  the	  reorientation	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  stated	  in	  2006	  that:	  ‘Our	  efforts	  for	  peace,	  reconciliation	  and	  development	  arises	  not	  only	  out	  of	  solidarity	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  dignity.	  Policies	  for	  peace	  is	  part	  of	  our	  security	  policy.	  This	  is	  both	  the	  main	  argument	  and	  a	  sufficient	  argument	  for	  the	  Norwegian	  peace	  policy’	  (Støre	  2006,	  own	  translation).	  The	  discursive	  merging	  of	  ideals	  and	  interests	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1990s	  has	  thus	  been	  institutionalized	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  but	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  subsumes	  peace	  engagement	  under	  a	  broadened	  notion	  of	  interests.	  This	  means	  that	  future	  involvement	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peacebuilding	  may	  to	  a	  larger	  extent	  be	  justified,	  designed	  and	  evaluated	  with	  reference	  to	  Norwegian	  interests,	  including	  the	  need	  to	  remain	  relevant	  and	  exert	  influence	  within	  arenas	  and	  alliances	  that	  are	  important	  for	  Norway’s	  economic	  and	  security	  interests.	  In	  practice,	  it	  also	  means	  that	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  has	  been	  opened	  up	  for	  a	  combination	  of	  orthodox	  and	  conservative	  approaches	  to	  liberal	  peacebuilding.	  Norway’s	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  joint	  military	  intervention	  in	  Libya	  in	  2011	  shows,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  new	  willingness	  to	  use	  hard	  power	  to	  end	  conflict	  and	  impose	  liberal	  peace.	  Norway’s	  current	  involvement	  in	  peacebuilding	  in	  Burma/Myanmar,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  provides	  illustrations	  of	  adjustments	  also	  within	  the	  political	  approach	  to	  peacebuilding.	  
	  
Norway’s	  peacebuilding	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  Burma/Myanmar	  is	  now,	  after	  decades	  of	  authoritarianism,	  intrastate	  conflicts	  and	  underdevelopment,	  experiencing	  a	  democratic	  opening	  that	  many	  observers	  assume	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  transition	  to	  liberal	  democracy,	  peace	  and	  development	  (Cheesman,	  Skidmore	  and	  Wilson	  2010;	  Diamond	  2012).	  Support	  for	  this	  optimism	  is	  found	  in	  a	  series	  of	  political	  changes,	  including	  release	  of	  political	  prisoners,	  lifting	  of	  media	  censorship,	  a	  widened	  space	  for	  political	  organizations,	  discursive	  shifts	  in	  favour	  of	  peace	  and	  democracy,	  and	  relatively	  free	  and	  fair	  by-­‐elections	  that	  have	  brought	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  leader	  Aung	  San	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Suu	  Kyi	  and	  her	  National	  League	  for	  Democracy	  (NLD)	  into	  parliament.	  The	  government	  has	  also	  signed	  a	  series	  of	  ceasefire	  agreements	  with	  armed	  groups	  and	  individual	  commanders	  from	  ethnic	  nationalities	  in	  conflict	  affected	  areas.	  In	  return,	  previously	  antagonistic	  Western	  actors	  (e.g.	  US,	  EU,	  Norway)	  have	  moved	  towards	  normalized	  diplomatic	  relations	  and	  lifted	  economic	  sanctions	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  changing	  discourses	  and	  reform	  policies	  from	  the	  Government	  of	  Myanmar	  (GoM).	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Domestic	  and	  international	  actors	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  democratization	  and	  peacebuilding	  in	  Burma/Myanmar.	  	  The	  dynamics	  and	  extent	  of	  democratization	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  debate.	  In	  explaining	  and	  predicting	  the	  political	  trajectory	  of	  change,	  different	  scholars	  place	  emphasis	  on	  the	  strength,	  strategies	  and	  relations	  among	  forces	  from	  “below”	  (the	  pro-­‐democracy	  and	  ethnic	  nationalities	  movements),	  from	  “above”	  (the	  democratizing	  authoritarian	  regime)	  and	  from	  “outside”	  (states	  and	  international	  organizations)	  (Dittmer	  2010;	  Nilsen	  2013;	  Rieffel	  2010)	  (Figure	  4).	  Norwegian	  government	  discourse	  on	  Burma/Myanmar	  portrays	  the	  democratic	  opening	  as	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  created	  by	  reformists	  within	  the	  regime,	  but	  also	  that	  this	  is	  a	  
 25	  
window	  that	  might	  close	  if	  the	  reformers	  are	  undermined	  by	  hardliners	  within	  the	  military	  and	  the	  ruling	  party	  (Callahan	  2012;	  Diamond	  2012).	  Hence,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  international	  peace	  and	  democracy	  promoters	  seize	  the	  opportunity	  and	  provide	  support	  to	  the	  reformists	  and	  their	  democratization	  agenda.	  A	  more	  critical	  interpretation	  holds	  that	  the	  military	  and	  ruling	  Union	  Solidarity	  and	  Development	  Party	  are	  implementing	  their	  own	  program	  for	  “Discipline-­‐flourishing	  democracy”	  without	  giving	  up	  any	  significant	  structural	  levers	  of	  power	  (Currie	  2012;	  Egreteau	  and	  Jagan	  2013).	  This	  has	  become	  a	  feasible	  strategy	  for	  continued	  power	  with	  international	  legitimacy,	  due	  to	  increased	  interest	  and	  emerging	  rivalry	  among	  four	  principal	  international	  stakeholders:	  USA,	  China,	  India	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Southeast	  Asian	  Nations	  (ASEAN).	  The	  top-­‐down	  and	  controlled	  form	  of	  democratization	  that	  is	  currently	  under	  way	  indicates	  that	  the	  regime	  has	  substantive	  capacity	  and	  leverage	  to	  use	  democratic	  reforms	  to	  gain	  international	  legitimacy	  and	  concessions	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  Burma/Myanmar	  and	  Southeast	  Asia	  have	  gained	  new	  international	  relevance	  (Haacke	  2006;	  Steinberg	  and	  Fan	  2012;	  Vidra	  et.al.	  2012).	  	  These	  brief	  remarks	  indicate	  that	  democratization	  and	  peace	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  raise	  critical	  questions	  about	  the	  power,	  strategies	  and	  relations	  among	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  actors,	  and	  Norway’s	  role	  must	  be	  situated	  and	  interpreted	  with	  reference	  to	  these	  constellations	  (Figure	  4).	  Norway	  has	  been	  a	  frontrunner	  for	  opening	  dialog	  with	  the	  regime	  (Currie	  2012).	  Norwegian	  government	  officials	  have	  developed	  close	  contact	  and	  continuous	  communication	  with	  the	  regime,	  and	  have	  also	  offered	  symbolic	  and	  material	  incentives	  and	  rewards	  for	  political	  reforms.	  Norway	  has	  been	  among	  the	  first	  Western	  states	  to	  accept	  “Myanmar”	  as	  the	  country’s	  official	  name,	  suspend	  sanctions	  and	  to	  work	  with	  the	  government	  to	  deliver	  humanitarian	  assistance	  in	  war-­‐affected	  areas.	  This	  means	  that	  Norway	  has	  functioned	  as	  an	  international	  door	  opener	  that	  could	  test	  the	  government’s	  sincerity	  and	  capacity	  for	  reforms	  and	  thereby	  do	  the	  groundwork	  for	  larger	  concessions	  by	  more	  powerful	  actors,	  especially	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU.	  While	  Norway	  may	  appear	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  relatively	  autonomous	  manner,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  its	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engagement	  is	  conducted	  in	  close	  dialog	  with	  “like-­‐minded”	  Western	  actors,	  thereby	  also	  supporting	  Norway’s	  international	  relevance	  and	  influence.	  It	  is	  also	  noticeable	  that	  Norway’s	  role	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  seems	  to	  be	  used	  to	  create	  favourable	  conditions	  for	  Norwegian	  corporations.	  	  	  The	  international	  politics	  of	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  more	  concrete	  peacebuilding	  efforts.	  Norway	  has	  initiated	  and	  led	  the	  Myanmar	  Peace	  Support	  Initiative,	  which	  was	  designed	  to	  become	  a	  comprehensive	  international	  peacebuilding	  operation	  in	  ceasefire	  zones.	  While	  the	  protagonists	  generally	  welcome	  peacebuilding	  in	  areas	  that	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  protracted	  armed	  conflict,	  this	  initiative	  is	  also	  seen	  as	  controversial.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  Norway,	  which	  has	  been	  a	  reliable	  supporter	  of	  pro-­‐democrats	  and	  ethnic	  nationalities,	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  working	  closely	  with	  the	  Government	  of	  Myanmar	  while	  lessening	  its	  links	  to	  opposition	  forces	  (Currie	  2012).	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  is	  thus	  accused	  of	  being	  biased	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  state	  and	  enabling	  the	  government	  to	  continue	  a	  long-­‐standing	  practice	  of	  offering	  ceasefires	  and	  clientelist	  development	  initiatives	  rather	  than	  substantial	  political	  reforms	  (South	  2008).	  This	  is	  congruent	  with	  peace	  engagement	  as	  a	  form	  of	  international	  alliance	  politics,	  but	  challenges	  the	  principle	  of	  impartiality	  that	  has	  been	  central	  to	  the	  Norwegian	  approach.	  It	  is	  also	  observed	  that	  the	  Norwegian	  initiative	  is	  restricted	  to	  post-­‐ceasefire	  peacebuilding,	  while	  the	  responsibility	  for	  conflict	  resolution	  remains	  with	  the	  government	  and	  parliament.	  This	  separation	  between	  peacebuilding	  and	  conflict	  resolution,	  it	  is	  argued,	  may	  allow	  the	  regime	  to	  pursue	  a	  strategy	  of	  managing	  rather	  than	  resolving	  local	  conflicts,	  with	  active	  support	  from	  Norway’s	  peacebuilding	  efforts.	  While	  Norway’s	  peacebuilding	  initiative	  may	  thus	  be	  effective	  as	  a	  form	  of	  realist	  foreign	  policy,	  there	  are	  critical	  questions	  about	  its	  ability	  to	  promote	  positive	  peace.	  	  These	  remarks	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  in	  Burma/Myanmar	  is	  more	  explicitly	  inscribed	  in	  Norwegian	  interest	  politics	  than	  what	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  earlier	  peace	  processes	  (for	  example	  in	  Sri	  Lanka).	  This	  is	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  realist	  reorientation	  in	  Norway’s	  foreign	  policy,	  but	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at	  the	  same	  time	  demonstrates	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  realpolitik	  of	  international	  alignments	  and	  the	  ideals	  of	  substantive	  democracy,	  peace	  and	  development	  (Harpviken	  and	  Skjelsbræk	  2010).	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  The	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  this	  article	  has	  been	  the	  marginal	  position	  of	  small	  states	  in	  studies	  of	  international	  relations,	  despite	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  developments	  that	  could	  have	  facilitated	  increased	  attention	  to	  non-­‐dominant	  actors	  in	  world	  politics.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  address	  this	  knowledge	  gap,	  the	  article	  has	  examined	  the	  emergence	  and	  transformation	  of	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Focusing	  on	  foreign	  policy	  discourses	  and	  practices,	  the	  article	  has	  portrayed	  peace	  engagement	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  resolve	  intrastate	  conflicts,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  support	  Norway’s	  standing,	  relevance	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  relations.	  It	  is	  found	  that	  peace	  engagement	  represents	  a	  strategic	  adaptation	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  Norway’s	  geostrategic	  relevance	  and	  leverage	  has	  been	  reduced	  while	  there	  was	  a	  widened	  international	  space	  for	  value	  diplomacy.	  In	  this	  situation,	  peace	  engagement	  became	  a	  priority	  in	  Norwegian	  foreign	  policy,	  both	  to	  promote	  peace	  as	  a	  global	  public	  good	  and	  to	  support	  Norway’s	  standing	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  relations.	  	  	  The	  article	  has	  also	  found	  that	  changing	  international	  relations	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  has	  challenged	  and	  reoriented	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  in	  a	  more	  realist	  direction.	  Contemporary	  foreign	  policy	  is	  thus	  characterized	  by	  a	  foregrounding	  of	  interests	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  values	  in	  the	  1990s.	  This	  rehabilitation	  of	  interests	  reflects	  the	  centrality	  of	  globalization,	  multipolarity	  and	  new	  realism	  in	  international	  relations,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  found	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  interest	  has	  been	  broadened	  to	  include	  the	  concept	  of	  value	  in	  idealism.	  Engagement	  politics	  has	  been	  institutionalized	  both	  as	  an	  interest	  in	  itself	  and	  as	  a	  means	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  other	  interests.	  Norway’s	  peace	  engagement	  should	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  small	  state	  foreign	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policy	  by	  non-­‐conventional	  means:	  peace	  engagement	  allows	  Norway	  to	  overcome	  the	  weakness	  associated	  with	  smallness	  and	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  “punching	  above	  its	  weight”	  internationally.	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